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XECUTION. The Texas courts have consistently required that a
will be executed in strict compliance with the formalities set forth
L in section 59 of the Texas Probate Code.' With the exception of
holographic wills, section 59 of the Code requires two competent witnesses
to attest to the execution of a will.2
In Wich v. Fleming 3 the Texas Supreme Court denied probate to a will
because the will was not executed in compliance with the provisions of
section 59. Specifically, the persons who witnessed the execution of the
will did not sign immediately below the testatrix's signature, but rather,
signed the instrument only at the conclusion of the self-proving affidavit.
The court followed its earlier holding in Boren v. Boren ,4 which estab-
lished the rule that a will is not admissible to probate if the witnesses
signed only the self-proving affidavit.5 The court in Wich reasoned that
the will and self-proving affidavit serve different purposes and require dif-
ferent types of intent on the part of the witnesses. 6 The court explained
that when a will is offered for probate, the sole function of the self-proving
affidavit is to eliminate the need for testimony as to the facts surrounding
the execution of the will.7 For that reason, the court concluded that a self-
proving affidavit is only effective if the will has been properly executed,
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1. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980) (originally enacted as TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 8283 (191 1));see, e.g., Poole v. Starke, 324 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maxey v. Queen, 206 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
2. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980). Section 59 of the Code also sets out
two other requirements: (I) the will must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by the
testator. Id.
3. 652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983).
4. 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966). The dissent in Wich disapproved of Boren and argued
that a signature under a self-proving affidavit can satisfy § 59 where, as in Wich, the wit-
nesses testify that they intended to attest to the execution of the testator's will. 652 S.W.2d at
356-57 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
5. 402 S.W.2d at 729.
6. 652 S.W.2d at 354.
7. Id.
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and that proper execution, as contemplated by section 59 of the Code, re-
quires the signatures of two witnesses directly below the testator's signa-
ture.8 Since the will in Wich did not satisfy these requirements, the court
held that the will was not admissible to probate. 9
The court recognized the harshness of its decision, but reasoned that the
legislature could have changed the result of the court's decision in Boren, if
it had disagreed with the court's interpretation in that case. The court
noted that since the decision in Boren, the legislature had twice amended
section 59 of the Probate Code without addressing the Boren problem.' 0
Courts have required literal compliance with the statutes allowing wills
since the adoption of the original Statute of Wills in 1540. This require-
ment retains its vitality today because it spares the courts the burden of
protracted litigation over the validity of writings, the form and appearance
of which do not resemble the solemn document that a will purports to be.
The problems raised in both Wich and Boren, however, are different.
Neither case involved a risk of fraud, forgery, or failure to have the requi-
site reflective state of mind. Both cases resulted from oversight on the part
of the testator or his counsel. Whether public policy should allow the ad-
vancement of technicalities over substance where the only benefit is to im-
pose a penalty upon the innocent testator and to provide a sharp warning
to others who might make a similar mistake is questionable. The result in
Boren and Wich is particularly anomalous because Texas law does not
require wills to be signed at the end as do a number of jurisdictions. That
only one other jurisdiction, Montana,I l has adopted the reasoning of Bo-
ren illustrates the degree to which the Texas Supreme Court is out of step.
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Florida have specifically rejected the reasoning of
Boren 12
Conscious Presence. Section 59 of the Code also requires that each witness
sign his or her name "in the presence of the testator."' 3 At least one Texas
court has employed the "conscious presence" test to determine whether a
witness is within the presence of the testator, thereby satisfying section 59's
requirement.' 4 That court interpreted the conscious presence test to mean
that the attestation must occur where the testator is able to see it from his
position at the time of attestation or from no less than a slightly altered
position.' 5 No assistance may be given to the testator to alter his
8. Id.
9. Id. at 355.
10. Id.
11. See In re Estate of Sample, 175 Mont. 93, 94, 572 P.2d 1232, 1233 (1977).
12. See In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re
Estate of Petty, 227 Kan. 697, 701, 608 P.2d 987, 992 (1980); In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445
P.2d 778, 782 (Okla. 1968).
13. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).






In Morris v. Estate of West 17 the testator signed his will in the presence
of two witnesses in a conference room located in a suite of offices. The
witnesses, however, left the conference room and signed the will in a secre-
tarial office located down the hall. Six days later the testator and witnesses
repeated this procedure when the testator signed a codicil to his will. The
Eastland court of appeals upheld the trial court in denying probate to both
the will and the codicil.' 8 The court concluded that the witnesses were not
within the conscious presence of the testator on each occasion as required
by section 59.19 The court's decision is surprising inasmuch as the trial
court presented to the jury a special issue on the question of presence ex-
pressed not in terms of "conscious presence" but merely in terms of "pres-
ence." 20 Arguably had the issue been presented differently to the jury,
they could have found that the witnesses signed the will and codicil in the
conscious presence of the testator. Perhaps the court's willingness to let
stand the trial court's formulation of the presence test can be explained by
the fact that a jury finding that the witnesses were in the conscious pres-
ence of the testator would be clearly against the weight of the evidence,
inasmuch as the witnesses left the conference room on each occasion.
Thus, under no strained construction could it be said that the witnesses
were in the conscious presence of the testator under such circumstances.
Revocation. The Texas Probate Code also requires strict compliance in
connection with the revocation of wills. Section 63 of the Code provides
that a will may be revoked by a subsequent will, codicil, or declaration in
writing executed with like formalities or by the testator's physical act of
destruction or cancellation of the will, or by his causing the will to be de-
stroyed or cancelled in his presence. 2'
In Morris v. Morris22 the testator directed his wife to destroy his will,
allegedly in the presence of the testator's aunt. The testator's wife, how-
ever, merely pretended to destroy the will, and she later offered the will for
probate. The Texas Supreme Court held that even the testator's clear in-
tent to revoke his will by physical destruction, coupled with his mistaken
belief that destruction had occurred, was not sufficient to effectively revoke
his will, when in fact the instrument remained intact and was offered for
probate.23 The court concluded that the statutory method of revoking a
will remains exclusive. The court explained that "[t]o hold otherwise
16. Id.
17. 643 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
18. Id. at 206.
19. Id. at 206-07.
20. The trial court in Morris presented the special issue as follows: "Do you find from a
preponderance of the evidence at the time Evelyn Cole and Judy Hooker signed their names
to the February 20, 1979 document they were in the presence of C.K. West? Answer: No."
Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
21. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 63 (Vernon 1980).
22. 642 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1982).
23. Id. at 450.
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would only invite fraud against the estate of a testator whose lips are for-
ever sealed by death."2 4
The absolute quality of the Morris decision is probably misleading even
though, for policy reasons, the court was correct in denying relief in the
case of the testator's mistake. The court explained that it refused to im-
pose a constructive trust because the contestants failed to establish fraud as
a matter of law. The court said the contestants were required to show
fraud as a matter of law because they first introduced the issue of fraud at
the appellate court level.25 However, the court concluded that a finding of
fraud as a matter of law was impossible because the parties provided dif-
ferent factual accounts. In this case the factual discrepancy occurred when
the testator's wife contradicted the testator's aunt and denied that the aunt
was present at the time the will was allegedly destroyed at the instruction
of the testator.26
In Howard Hughes Medical Institute v. Neff2 7 the: Howard Hughes Medi-
cal Institute filed an application with the Harris County Probate Court for
the probate of a lost will allegedly executed by Howard Hughes between
1953 and 1963. The Institute argued in the alternative for the probate of
Hughes's lost will allegedly executed in 1925. The Institute claimed it was
the primary beneficiary under the more recent will and was the intended
beneficiary under the doctrine of cy pres under the 1925 will. During the
probate proceedings, the State of Texas and a court-appointed attorney ad
litem for unknown heirs moved that the Institute be required to show
standing as a party interested in the Hughes estate. In addition, the execu-
tors of Hughes's aunt's and cousin's estates each filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment. The contestants presented their motions at the same
hearing, at which time the probate court rendered judgment in favor of the
will contestants and denied and dismissed the Institute's application for
probate.
The Institute appealed the probate court order, arguing that summary
judgment should have been denied because of secondary evidence intro-
duced at trial to prove the existence of Hughes's lost wills. 28 In support of




27. 640 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
28. Id. at 947. The Institute produced the following evidence: two letters to Hughes
written by his attorney and referring to Hughes's will; an unsigned file copy of a Hughes
will; an original holographic codicil in Hughes's handwriting; and deposition testimony of a
former executive in Hughes's company who testified to seeing a document that was purport-
edly Hughes's will.
29. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 84(b) (Vernon 1980) provides:
Attested Written Will. If not self-proved as provided in this Code, an attested
written will produced in court may be proved:
(1) By the sworn testimony or affidavit of one or more of the subscribing
witnesses thereto, taken in open court.
(2) If all the witnesses are non-residents of the county, or those who are
residents are unable to attend court, by the sworn testimony of any one or
[Vol. 38
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permissive best evidence rule" permitting the use of secondary evidence
when the proponent of the evidence can account for the absence of pre-
ferred evidence. 30 In connection with this section the Institute cited sec-
tion 88(b) of the Code, which provides that due execution of a will must be
proved to the "satisfaction of the court."' 3' The Institute's position appar-
ently was that it needed only to "satisfy the court" in order to obtain pro-
bate and that it did not need to be concerned with proving due execution.
The appellate court rejected the Institute's argument, stating that the Insti-
tute must do more: It must prove to the satisfaction of the court that the
testator executed the will in compliance with the formalities and solemni-
ties required by sections 84 and 85 of the Probate Code to make it a valid
will.32 Thus, for summary judgment purposes, the question became one of
determining whether the parties disagreed about any facts relating to the
testator's compliance with the formalities and solemnities required for exe-
cution of a valid will. Concluding that the secondary evidence offered did
not relate to those formalities and solemnities, the court held that the trial
court had not erred in granting summary judgment for the contestants.
The Institute further argued that section 84(b) of the Code, which sets
forth the methods for proving the due execution of a will not self-proved,
is not mandatory because the section uses the word "may" in listing the
ways an attested will may be proved. In support of its contention, the In-
stitute cited In re Estate of Page33 for the general rule that the require-
ments of section 84 are not mandatory.
The Hughes court, however, found Page distinguishable from the in-
stant case.34 In Page the secondary evidence proffered was the testimony
of two witnesses as to the genuineness of the signatures of the testator and
more of them by deposition, either written or oral, taken in the same manner
and under the same rules as depositions taken in other civil actions; or, if no
opposition in writing to such will is filed on or before the date set for hearing
thereon, then by the sworn testimony or affidavit of two witnesses taken in
open court, or by deposition in the manner provided herein, to the signature
or the handwriting evidenced thereby of one or more of the attesting wit-
nesses, or of the testator, if he signed the will; or, if it be shown under oath to
the satisfaction of the court that, diligent search having been made, only one
witness can be found who can make the required proof, then by the sworn
testimony or affidavit of such one taken in open court, or by deposition in the
manner provided herein, to such signatures or handwriting.
(3) If none of the witnesses is living, or if all of such witnesses are mem-
bers of the armed forces of the United States of America or of any auxiliary
thereof, . . . and are beyond the jurisdiction of the court, by two witnesses to
the handwriting of one or both of the subscribing witnesses thereto, or of the
testator, if signed by him, and such proof may be either by sworn testimony or
affidavit taken in open court, or by deposition . . . ; or, if it be shown under
oath to the satisfaction of the court that, diligent search having been made,
only one witness can be found who can make the required proof, then by the
sworn testimony or affidavit of such one taken in open court, or by deposition
in the manner provided herein, to such signatures and handwriting.
30. 640 S.W.2d at 947.
31. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(b) (Vernon 1980).
32. 640 S.W.2d at 947.
33. 544 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
34. 640 S.W.2d at 948.
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the other deceased or unlocated witnesses. The Iughes court stated the
evidence presented in Page was "precisely the kind of secondary evidence
that Probate Code § 84(b)(3) requires. '3 5 Therefore, the Hughes court
concluded, the secondary evidence upon which the Institute relied was not
the kind contemplated by section 84(b)(3). 36 Furthermore, the Hughes
court refused some of the evidence offered by the Institute on evidentiary
grounds. 37 Ultimately the court concluded that the Institute failed to carry
its burden of proof with regard to due execution on two grounds: (1) it
failed to establish the identity of the attesting witnesses and, without this
information, the burden of proving due execution became very difficult;
and (2) it failed to satisfy the requirements of section 85 of the Code, con-
trolling manner of proof of due execution, which, unlike the best evidence
rules of section 84, are mandatory. 38
The court also addressed the issue of the Institute's standing to make
application for the probate of Hughes's will. Initially, the court cited Ham-
ilton v. Gregory39 for the general rule that while "it is not necessary [for the
proponent] to develop facts necessary to entitle [the will] to probate," the
proponent must "show that he was named as a beneficiary in a testamen-
tary instrument executed with the formalities required by law, that is, a
will."' 40 The Hughes court stated that the Institute failed to raise a fact
issue with regard to the due execution of either of the wills and held that
the Institute lacked the requisite standing to apply for probate of the lost
will.41 Furthermore, the court stated that the Institute was not named in
the 1925 will and that the doctrine of cy pres did not apply because no
legal or practical impediment prevented carrying out the charitable be-
quest described in the alleged 1925 will. 42
Definition of Mental Capacity. In Wolters v. Wright 43 the trial court sub-
mitted the following special issue regarding testamentary capacity to the
jury:
By the term "testamentary capacity" is meant that the person making
the will must, at the time the will is executed, have sufficient mental
ability to understand the business in which he is engaged, the effect of
his acts in making the will, the capacity to know the objects of his
bounty and their claims upon him, and the general nature and extent
of his property. 44
The will contestants, relatives of the decedent, argued that the trial court





39. 482 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
40. Id. at 289.
41. 640 S.W.2d at 953.
42. Id.
43. 649 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 650-5 1.
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mental capacity the testator had to have the ability to "collect in his mind
the elements of the business to be transacted and to hold them long enough
...to be able to form a reasonable judgment as to them."'45 Upholding
the trial court, the court of appeals stated that the test of sufficiency of a
definition turns on whether it allows the jurors to understand the term it
defines; the court held that the definition in the instant case adequately
explained mental capacity to the jury.46
Mental Capacity/Undue Influence. In Croucher v. Croucher4 7 Virginia
Croucher appealed an order of the probate court that held her deceased
husband's will to be null and void. Virginia's husband, James Croucher,
executed his will in July 1980 and died in August 1980. Initially,
Croucher's will, which named Virginia as sole beneficiary and independ-
ent executrix, was admitted to probate. The testator's children from a pre-
vious marriage, however, contested the admission of the will to probate,
claiming that their father was not of sound mind at the time he executed
the will. The contesting children also argued that Virginia exerted undue
influence over their father at the time of the will's execution.
At trial, the will contestants produced evidence showing that their father
had been seriously ill two or three years prior to his death, that he had
become confused, and that his memory had become sketchy. Further-
more, Croucher's medical records reflected that five days prior to his death
Croucher experienced "decreasing mental status."'48 Mrs. Croucher, how-
ever, introduced evidence suggesting that her husband was alert and men-
tally competent just before and at the time of the execution of his will.
In response to the issue of the testator's mental capacity, the court of
appeals relied on Lee v. Lee49 for the Texas rule with regard to testamen-
tary mental capacity. The Croucher court stated:
In Lee ...the court said the inquiry in a will contest on the ground
of testamentary incapacity is the condition of the testator's mind on
the day the will was executed. The court also said:
However, only that evidence of incompetency at other times has
probative force which demonstrates that the condition persists and
"has some probability of being the same condition which obtained
at the time of the will's making."'50
Based on the authorities cited, the court of appeals held that the evi-
dence advanced at trial was insufficient to support the trial court's conclu-
sion that Croucher lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of his will. 51 The court recognized that although the medical
records reflected substantial physical problems, mental capacity could not
45. Id. at 651.
46. Id.
47. 654 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982), rev'd, 660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983).
48. 654 S.W.2d at 476.
49. 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1968), cited in Croucher, 654 S.W.2d at 477.
50. 654 S.W.2d at 477.
51. Id.
1984]
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be discerned merely from physical infirmity. Finding nothing in the medi-
cal records to reflect that on the date of the making of the will Croucher
lacked testamentary capacity, the court held the will was properly admit-
ted to probate.52 In addition, the court found no evidence to support the
allegation of undue influence by Virginia at the time her husband's will
was executed.5 3 The court refused to set aside the will "on proof of facts
which do no more than show an opportunity to exercise influence."
5 4
The supreme court reversed, however, on the ground that Mrs. Croucher
failed to prove as a matter of law that Mr. Croucher had the requisite
testamentary capacity. 5 The supreme court held that the evidence ad-
duced at the trial court by the Croucher children was sufficient to raise a
question of fact as to Mr. Croucher's testamentary capacity.56 The court
therefore reinstated the trial court's judgment.57
Cases like Croucher raise an interesting question. Clearly, the burden of
proving testamentary capacity is on the proponent of the will. But in the
absence of any legislative authorization of pre-death adjudication of testa-
mentary capacity, will preparers are often left with a dilemma. When the
prospective testator suffers any physical or mental disability, even advanc-
ing age, the post-death opportunity to assert lack of capacity will always
exist. While conventional wisdom suggests that will contests should be
"tried when signed," the opportunity for unequivocally establishing capac-
ity is sometimes absent at that time. In such a case, one conclusion is that
the testator should be deprived of the opportunity of making a will. As a
matter of policy, however, the attorney should probably encourage the tes-
tator to execute the will and depend upon the testator's heirs, through the
judicial system, to determine capacity in cases in which the will is not to
their liking. The alternative would be for one person, usually the preparer
of the will, to be forced to make determinations at the time of execution
that he has neither the competence nor the authority to make. The prob-
lem is particularly acute when a disposition does not favor the testator's
heirs, perhaps because they are remote relatives, but is perfectly "natural"
in the sense of favoring persons close to the testator.
Joint Wills. Joint wills continue to be a problem, although circumstances
warranting the execution of a joint will are difficult if not impossible to
imagine. In Texas the courts have held that the primary factor in deter-
mining whether a joint will is contractual in nature and therefore binding
on both parties is whether "the will, as a whole, sets forth a comprehensive




55. 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35, 43, 273 S.W.2d 588, 593 (1954); Fisher v. Capp, 597
S.W.2d 393, 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ refd n.r.c.).
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The party contending that a joint will is contractual in nature bears the
burden of proving that a contract between the testators existed. 59 The pro-
ponent of the contract theory may utilize the will provisions alone or in
combination with extrinsic evidence to meet this burden. 60 Will provisions
that characterize the property of both testators as one estate and provide
for the disposition of such property at the death of the surviving testator, as
well as at the death of the predeceasing testator, are strong evidence of the
contractual relationship between the testators.6 1
In Trilca v. Bunch62 the will provided for a comprehensive plan that
included the disposition of the estate at the death of the surviving testator.
Although the will in Trlica used the term "fee simple" to describe the es-
tate that was to pass to the survivor of the two testators, the court held that
such terminology was not conclusive evidence of the lack of a contractual
will.63 The Trilca court further held that when the document was re-
viewed in its entirety, the intent of the testators was clearly to create a
mutual contractual obligation.64
The court in Cox v. Rice Trust, Inc. ,65 however, held that the joint will in
question imposed no contractual obligation on the surviving testator be-
cause of the clarity of the first paragraph of the will, which provided for
the vesting of a fee simple estate in the surviving testator.66 The third
paragraph of the will created a remainder interest that would vest in the
designated legatees in the event of the simultaneous death of both testa-
tors, or would vest in the surviving testator in the event that one testator
should predecease the other. In light of the clear language in the first para-
graph, the court held that the phrase "or if one of us should have prede-
ceased the other" in the third paragraph of the will was ambiguous and out
of place in the testator's general scheme of testamentary disposition, and
the will therefore did not create a joint and mutual obligation. 67 In sup-
port of its holding the court of appeals cited the rule of construction pro-
nounced in Gilliam v. Mahon68 that if the language of the first clause of a
will is clear and unambiguous, then the estate bequeathed by that first
59. Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 623, 193 S.W.2d 165, 167 (1946).
60. Id. at 623, 193 S.W.2d at 167-68.
61. Id.
62. 642 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
63. Id. at 543.
64. Id. The Trilca court stated:
[T]he language creating the first estate is not controlling because the primary
factor is whether the testators have agreed to the disposition of the estate re-
maining in the hands of the survivor. Neither can we agree that the use of the
language "dispose of' in the third paragraph indicates that the testators did
not intend to be contractually bound by the provisions of the joint will. Al-
though this language gives the survivor the right to dispose of the estate during
his or her lifetime, it does not exclude a contractual obligation not to make a
different disposition by will.
Id.
65. 648 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
66. Id. at 760.
67. Id.
68. 231 S.W. 712 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, judgmt adopted).
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clause shall not be diminished by a subsequent clause that employs ambig-
uous or uncertain language. 69 The court in Cox therefore held that a fee
simple estate was created in the surviving testator and that this estate was
not affected by the uncertain and ambiguous language in the third para-
graph of the will.70
Perl v. Howell7' involved a joint will that contained several provisions
evidencing a comprehensive plan for the disposition of the two testators'
property. The Perl court held that the will treated the husband's and wife's
estates as one, disposing of the estate property only at the deaths of both
spouses.72 The court further found that nowhere in the will did the testa-
tors attempt to dispose of their individual interests. Therefore, the Perl
court held, the will evidenced the mutual intent of the testators to create a
contract.
73
Construction. Will construction involves the process of ascertaining the
testator's intention. Ideally, each testator would speak unequivocally and
unambiguously in expressing his testamentary scheme. In those instances
when the testator's intention is unclear, however, the court must construe
the will. In so doing, the courts have developed certain rules of construc-
tion. Texas courts supposedly look at the testamentary document as a
whole as well as the circumstances surrounding execution of the will to
ascertain the testator's intent.74
In re Estate of Haldiman75 involved the construction of a holographic
will. The Haldiman will listed five specific cash bequests followed by the
phrase "the money left over after all is paid, to go to [certain charities]. ' 76
The document was then signed and witnessed. A sheet of paper listing the
names and addresses of everyone named in the will was attached to the
handwritten instrument. The court found the phrase "the money left over
after all is paid" to be ambiguous because, while it appeared to be an at-
tempt to dispose of the remainder of the testator's estate, the phrase only
stated that the remaining money from the estate should be paid to the
enumerated charities.77 The court therefore reviewed the will provisions
as a whole and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the will's
execution. The court concluded that the testator's intent was that this
phrase have the effect of a general residuary clause.78
69. Id. at 713, citedin Cox, 648 S.W.2d at 760.
70. 648 S.W.2d at 760.
71. 650 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id. at 525.
73. Id.
74. See Silverthorn v. Jennings, 620 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Pruett v. Berkeley, 405 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, no
writ).
75. 653 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
76. Id. at 338.
77. Id. at 339.
78. Id. The Haldiman court based its construction of the will on other Texas cases
applying rules of will construction. Id. (citing Shriner's Hospital for Crippled Children v.
Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980) (mere making of will creates presumption that testa-
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In another recent case, House v. Republic Bank Brownwood,79 the wills
of Charles Sandier and his wife each provided for the establishment of a
testamentary trust for the benefit of the testator's children or, if the chil-
dren should be deceased at that time, for the benefit of their grandchildren.
With regard to the trust, each will contained a provision stating, "[The
Trustee] is authorized to pay ...the net income from the trust estate
herein created to our two children, equally, or if one of them should pass
away, the deceased child's one half shall be paid to the legal guardian of
the children of such deceased child."'80
The issue on appeal was whether the testators intended that the trust
income was to be paid only to those grandchildren having a legal guard-
ian. Such a construction would have the effect of prohibiting the testators'
adult grandchildren from receiving trust income. After reviewing the tes-
tators' wills as a whole and the circumstances surrounding their execution,
the court rejected this construction. The court construed the wills to mean
that upon the death of the testator, his half of the estate would be paid
equally to his children, but if any child at the time of the testator's death
was either a minor or incompetent, then that child's interest in the trust
was to be paid to the child's guardian. 81
Ademption by Extinction/Premortem Accessions. Undoubtedly every testa-
tor will confront change after the execution of his or her will. Change in
property arises from extinction or acquisition. This potential for change
places an enormous burden on will preparers, who are charged with antici-
pating that change or suffering the potential disaster of litigation over the
meaning of provisions in the will that fail to take account of the potential
for change completely. It should be clear, however, that even the most
conscientious of practitioners who make reasonable efforts to anticipate
change cannot prevent litigation growing out of changes occurring subse-
quent to a will's execution. Guy v. Crill82 is illustrative.
Miriam Grice's will provided for seven separate bequests, each consist-
ing of a fractional share of the testatrix's interest in First National Bank in
Dallas. The will stated that each beneficiary was to receive a certain
amount of First National stock, together with all dividends and other at-
tendant rights and benefits at the time of the testatrix's death. The instru-
ment further provided that the residue of the estate was to pass to certain
residual beneficiaries. After the execution of Grice's will, but before her
death, the testatrix's shares in First National Bank were exchanged for
shares in First International Bancshares, due to a reorganization in First
tor did not intend to die intestate); Welch v. Staach, 531 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1975) (infor-
mal language used by layman construed liberally to respect testator's intent); Haynes v.
Henderson, 345 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ refd n.r.e.) (words
"sum" or "money" construed liberally to include all kinds of personal or real property)).
79. 641 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
80. Id. at 665 (emphasis supplied by court).
81. Id.
82. 654 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
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National's capital structure. At the time of Grice's death, her estate con-
sisted primarily of the stock holdings described in the specific bequests
and, therefore, her residuary estate was insufficient to cover estate taxes
and expenses. Accordingly, the court ordered that the specific bequests of
stock were to be reduced proportionately to pay the estate taxes and costs
of administration. Thereafter, the remaining shares of stock were deliv-
ered to the legatees named in the will.
The residual beneficiaries in Crill argued, however, that the specific be-
quests of stock were adeemed at the time the testatrix received Bancshares
stock in replacement of First National stock. The residual beneficiaries
also contended that the phrase "together with all dividends, rights and
benefits declared thereon at the time of my death, and all rights and bene-
fits thereof' '8 3 was a dividend declared clause that entitled the named
beneficiaries only to the dividends, rights, and benefits declared but not
received on the testatrix's date of death. There being no such dividends,
rights, or benefits, the residual beneficiaries argued that all of Grice's stock
passed to the residuary estate.
The Crill court rejected the theory of ademption, holding that the testa-
trix's intent was merely to include in the bequest all the rights and benefits
flowing from her ownership of the First National Bank stock.84 The court
further held that "any change in the shares, whether of form or substance,
is immaterial. ' 85 In addition, the court disagreed with the residuary bene-
ficiaries' construction of the quoted provision and held that the "all rights
and benefits thereof' provision was intended to broaden, not limit, the
scope of the specific bequests. 86
The residual beneficiaries in Crill also contended that the residuary
clause by itself entitled them to receive all of the Bancshares stock inas-
much as the clause provided that all of the property the testatrix acquired
after the execution of her will was to pass to the residual estate. Because
the Bancshares stock was acquired after the execution of the will, the
residual beneficiaries argued that the stock passed to them. Again the
court held that the stock was not part of the residuary estate because the
conversion of the First National Bank stock into Bancshares stock consti-
tuted one of the rights and benefits of ownership of the stock the testatrix
had bequeathed.8 7 The residuary beneficiaries argued, in the alternative,
that the trial court erred in granting the legatees of the stock the right to
receive stock dividends as well as stock splits due to the ownership of the
stock since the date of the will. The court held that the trial court did not
err in granting all benefits to the legatees, stating that stock dividends and
stock splits are also rights and benefits flowing from ownership of the
original bank stock and, consequently, were included in the bequest. 88
83. Id. at 815.
84. Id. at 816.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 816-17.
88. Id. at 817.
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Trusts for Benefit of Incompetents. In State v. Whitaker89 a probate court
held that a will and codicil created a testamentary trust for the specific
purpose of paying burial expenses upon the death of the testatrix's two
incompetent sons. The testatrix appointed the executor of her estate as the
legal guardian of the estates and persons of her two sons. The testatrix
further designated the legal guardian of the estates of her two sons as the
beneficiary under her life insurance policy. The State of Texas brought
suit against the sons' guardian in an attempt to recover expenses incurred
by the state for the care, support, and maintenance of the two sons in a
state school under the terms of section 61(b) of article 5547-300.90 The
probate court held that the corpus of the wards' estate was derived from
proceeds of the life insurance on their mother's life and that, in reality, the
estate was a trust for the benefit of the two sons as contemplated by the
Texas Legislature in section 61(a)-(g) of the statute. 91
Article 5547-300, section 61(b) provides that a mentally retarded per-
son is liable for the expense of his support and maintenance except as pro-
vided by section 6 1(g).92 Section 61(g) states that a ward of the state is not
liable for the expense of his maintenance and support if the ward's estate
consists of a beneficial interest in a trust with an aggregate value not ex-
ceeding $50,000.93 Because the proceeds from the policies funding the
corpus of the guardianship, which the probate court held to be a trust,
were less than $50,000, the probate court held the state was precluded from
reaching the trust property to satisfy the sons' support expenses.
The Waco court of appeals held, however, that the guardianship created
under the testatrix's codicil to her will was not in substance a trust for the
benefit of the testatrix's two sons.94 Furthermore, the court stated, the four
comers of the testatrix's will and codicil and the circumstances surround-
ing its execution indicated that a trust was not created by implication.95
The testatrix originally executed a will providing for the creation of a trust
for the support and maintenance of her two sons, naming her executor as
guardian over only the persons of her two sons. By a codicil to her original
will the testatrix revoked the provision that created the support and main-
89. 638 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
90. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, § 61(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
91. 638 S.W.2d at 190.
92. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 5547-300, § 61(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
Parents of a mentally retarded person who is 18 years of age or older shall not
be required to pay for his support and maintenance as a resident in a residen-
tial care facility operated by the department, but the mentally retarded person
and his estate shall be liable for his support and maintenance regardless of his
age, except as provided in Subsection (g) of this section.
93. Id. § 6 1(g) provides:
For the purposes of this subchapter no portion of the corpus or income of a
trust or trusts, with an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $50,000, of
which a mentally retarded person is a beneficiary shall be considered to be the
property of such mentally retarded person or his estate, and no portion of the
corpus or income of such trust shall be liable for the support and maintenance
of such mentally retarded person regardless of his age.
94. 638 S.W.2d at 191.
95. Id.
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tenance trust and the provision naming the executor as guardian over the
persons of her two sons and thereafter created an express trust for the sole
purpose of paying for the sons' burial expenses. In addition, the codicil
renamed the executor as guardian of both the persons and the estates of
the incompetent sons. The Whitaker court therefore concluded that the
principal of the sons' estates was held by the testatrix's executor as a
guardian rather than as a trustee and, therefore, the principal was subject
to the state's claims for expenses incurred on behalf of the sons while they
were under state care. 96
Title Questions During Estate Administration. A vexing problem in the ad-
ministration of many estates is the question of when the administration is
complete. The issue becomes particularly important in the income tax
context because of the estate's utility as a tax shelter, which stems from the
fact that income received by the estate is taxed to the estate unless it is
distributed to the estate's beneficiaries. 97 Thus, the first dollars of income
the estate receives will be taxed at lower rates than if these dollars were
taxed to the beneficiaries and stacked on top of the beneficiaries' other
income. Accordingly, in many instances, the beneficiaries want to keep the
estate open as long as possible. For this reason, the Treasury has taken the
position that the estate may remain open, for income tax purposes, only for
a reasonable period of time to complete the administration of the estate.
In Larson v. Enserch Exploration, Inc. 98 Stella Bryant's will created a
testamentary trust for her seven brothers and sisters. The will appointed
three of the testatrix's brothers to serve as independent executors and di-
rected them to file a final report with the county probate court. The will
further provided that the balance of the estate was to pass automatically to
the Stella Bryant trust. All real estate owned by Bryant was to be operated
by the executors for three years before passing into the trust. The will also
appointed three of Bryant's brothers, including two of the executors, to
serve as trustees under the testamentary trust, which was to contain the
real and personal property shown in the executors' final report. The testa-
mentary trust was to continue for ten years from the date of the filing of
the final report.
Before the final report was filed, one of the testatrix's brothers, as execu-
tor, executed an oil and gas lease to Enserch. Thereafter, two other broth-
ers, in their capacities as trustees, leased the identical mineral interest to a
third party, who subsequently assigned the lease to Larson. Larson and
the two trustees who had leased the mineral interest to Larson's assignor
brought suit to clear title to Larson's interest.
The court examined Bryant's will to determine whether the trustees or
executors controlled the assets of her estate at the time the leases were
executed. The court found that Mrs. Bryant intended that a final report be
96. Id. at 191-92.
97. I.R.C. §§ 661-662 (1982).
98. 644 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
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filed by the executors of her estate before the residue would pass to the
trust.99 The Larson court concluded that the trustees therefore lacked au-
thority to execute an oil and gas lease to Larson's assignor, because the
filing of the final report constituted a condition precedent to the activation
of the trust and the commencement of the duties and powers of the trust-
ees.'°° Until the filing of the final report occurred, "neither the property in
the trust nor the term of the trust [was] known." 0 l Inasmuch as the report
had not been filed, the Larson court held that the trust had not yet been
activated, and thus the trustees lacked authority to execute a lease on be-
half of the trust.102 The Larson case therefore suggests that an estate can
remain open indefinitely. While this may be true for state law purposes, it
is not true for federal income tax purposes.
Larson also raises the question of title. In particular, the case raises the
issue of who has title to the decedent's property during administration.
Whether title is in the executor or in the beneficiaries remains unclear.
The court in Larson said, essentially, that title is wherever the testator puts
it and, in the Larson case, the testatrix gave title to her executors and not to
the beneficiaries of her estate, her trustees.
Adoption of an Adult. In Foster v. Foster 10 3 the court was confronted with
the old but infrequently encountered problem of whether an adult can be
adopted into the line of descent. More precisely, the question was whether
B, the child ofA, could adopt C, an adult, and thereby cause C to have the
same claims against A's estate as a natural child of B would have. The
Foster court held that, for purposes of the law of descent and distribution
in Texas, an adult cannot be adopted into the line of descent so as to have
the rights enjoyed by a natural child against the estate of the adoptive
parent's ancestors. 1 4
The court noted the general rule that a child, within the meaning of the
Family and Probate Codes, 05 was a person under the age of twenty-one or
an age otherwise prescribed by statute defining majority. The court relied
on this definition of children and held that article 46a, section 9 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which allows an adoptive child to inherit
from his adoptive parents, does not allow an individual who was an adult
when adopted to inherit through his adoptive parents under the intestate
succession laws of Texas.' °6 In summary, a natural child clearly can in-
heritfrom and through his parents. Similarly, a child adopted while under
the age of twenty-one, can inheritfrom and through his adoptive parents.




103. 641 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
104. Id. at 695.
105. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.55 (Vernon Supp. 1984); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(b)
(Vernon 1980).
106. 641 S.W.2d at 695 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 9 (Vernon 1969)).
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After Foster, however, a person adopted while an adult can only inherit
from his adoptive parents, not through them.
II. TRUSTS
Texas Trust Code. Clearly the most important development pertaining to
trusts in Texas was the adoption of the Texas Trust Code. 107 The Trust
Code, together with the Texas Trust Act,'08 is to "be considered one con-
tinuous statute."' 1 9 The provisions of the Trust Code apply to all trusts
created after January 1, 1984, as well as to "all transactions occurring on or
after January 1, 1984, relating to trusts created before January 1, 1984."
While a discussion of the Trust Code is beyond the scope of this survey, it
is appropriate to note that the committee responsible for development of
the Trust Code determined that the existing Texas Trust Act was "funda-
mentally sound" and that the "policy of each substantive provision of the
Act should be continued.""10 Notwithstanding this objective, the Texas
Trust Code significantly expanded the subjects addressed by Texas trust
legislation and, for that reason, the Trust Code requires careful
examination.
Trusts as Testamentary Substitutes. The Texas courts continue to take a
liberal view of the use of a revocable trust as a testamentary substitute,
notwithstanding the long standing notion that the policy of the wills act
requires all testamentary devices to be executed in literal compliance with
the formalities specified in the statute governing the execution of wills. I''
The literal compliance requirement grew out of judicial concern that, with-
out such specific compliance, the opportunity for fraud and forgery would
be enlarged. Moreover, the required formalities induce a reflective state of
mind in the testator.
Without doubt the revocable trust should enjoy exception from the re-
quirements of the wills act when the concerns that prompted development
of the literal compliance requirement are not present. For example, it is
most evident that fraud and forgery are absent in cases in which the revo-
cable trust is funded during the testator's lifetime and the trust is not self-
trusteed. In such a case the settlor has had the opportunity not only to
execute the writing that purports to be the trust agreement, but he or she
has also actually transferred property to the trustee during his or her life-
time and had the opportunity to see the trust in operation. While such
107. Texas Trust Code, ch. 567, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3269 (codified at TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 111.001-115-017 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
108. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 7425b--I to -47 (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1982-
1983) (now codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.001-113.152, 114.001-
115.016 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
109. Texas Trust Code, ch. 567, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3269, 3271 (codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 11 1.002(b) (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
110. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, SECTION OF REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW,
GUIDE TO THE TEXAS TRUST CODE 2 (1983).
1I1. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980). See generally Langbein, Substan-
tial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975).
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circumstances are no guarantee that the settlor understands how the prop-
erty will be disposed of after his or her death, the more extensive participa-
tion by the settlor with the revocable trust during his or her lifetime should
provide more assurance than is present with a will that the settlor knew
and understood the contents of the instrument. In the case of a self-trust-
eed revocable trust, less certainty exists that the opportunity for fraud and
forgery has been minimized, particularly when the settlor did not formally
transfer property to the trust during his or her lifetime. The Texas cases
recently decided illustrate the growing popularity of the revocable trust
and the attitude of the courts toward these will substitutes.
In Wilkerson v. McCleary' t 2 the court scrutinized the validity of four
"Dacey" inter vivos trusts, which were each created by a declaration of
trust. In Texas an express trust may be created by a written declaration by
the owner of the property that he holds the property as trustee for an-
other. 13 The Wilkerson court addressed collectively the validity of three
of the four trusts containing similar provisions. Each of the three trust
declarations provided that the settlor was to act as trustee of the property
mentioned in each instrument for the benefit of Jeanette Wilkerson. In the
event of the settlor's death or legal incapability, the instrument directed
that Jeanette Wilkerson was to be appointed successor trustee, her sole
duty being to transfer the property to herself free of trust. In addition, the
settlor trustee retained extensive control over the use and disposition of the
property in each trust, which consisted of real estate, stock, household fur-
nishings, and the personal effects of the settlor.
Upon creation of the trusts, the settlor failed to transfer the deed to the
real estate to herself as trustee. Furthermore, she did not request the reis-
suance of stock certificates to herself as trustee nor did she execute a deed
to herself as trustee of the premises where the personal property sat in
storage. The issue on appeal turned on whether the failure of the settlor to
transfer the trust property formally to herself as trustee invalidated the
trusts. The appellate court held that the trusts were valid, basing its opin-
ion on the rationale in Weste)feld v. Huckaby 14 that a trust comes into
existence because it contains a lifetime purpose and not because of the
simultaneous occurrence of a declaration of trust and transfer of deeds."
15
The court also stated that although Texas statutes provide that a declara-
tion of trust over real property will be invalid unless created by a written
112. 647 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, no writ).
113. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.001(1) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified at TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-7 (Vernon 1960)).
114. 474 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971).
115. Wilkerson, 647 S.W.2d at 80. The Wilkerson court stated:
The gravamen of Westerfeld is not the deed and declaration of trust combina-
tion; rather, it is because the trusts contained a lifetime purpose that the court
upheld them against the challenge of being sham trusts. Like the trust at bar,
the successor trustee was to succeed the settlor trustee in the event of the set-
tlor trustee's death or incapacity.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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instrument subscribed by the settlor,1 6 Texas courts have held that, with
respect to a real estate trust, parol evidence may be used to establish a
constructive trust over real estate, even though the deed to such real estate
is ambiguous on its face.' 17
The declaration of the fourth trust in Wilkerson provided that the settlor
was holding a checking-savings account at the Home Savings & Loan As-
sociation in trust for a named beneficiary. At the time of the declaration,
the settlor owned four accounts at the savings and loan, but the declaration
did not indicate which account was the trust property. The court con-
cluded from the singular language used in the trust declaration that the
settlor intended only one of her four accounts to be held in trust.' 1 8 Since
it was impossible from the language of the declaration, however, to deter-
mine which of the four accounts represented the trust res, the court held
that the trust failed for lack of certainty. 119
In Cisneros v. San Miguel 20 Juan Cisneros placed a real estate lien note
and deed of trust, which he received in the sale of certain realty, in Union
National Bank of Laredo pursuant to a trust agreement with the bank.
Under the terms of the agreement, the bank held the property for Cis-
neros's benefit and, if Cisneros should die intestate, the property was to
pass to a named beneficiary. Upon Cisneros's death the bank filed an in-
terpleader action to determine the proper owner of the trust proceeds. The
sole issue on appeal was whether the trust agreement between Cisneros
and the bank created a valid inter vivos trust. Cisneros's wife contested
the trust's validity. She argued that the trust agreement was testamentary
in nature because the beneficiary would receive property only on the death
of the settlor and that consequently a valid trust relationship did not exist
between Cisneros and the bank. Mrs. Cisneros argued, moreover, that the
agreement was not a valid testamentary document because the parties had
not complied with the formalities for creation of a testamentary instrument
as provided in section 59 of the Probate Code. The San Antonio court of
appeals held, however, that the agreement between Cisneros and the bank
created a valid inter vivos trust. 12  The court noted that a majority of
cases now uphold the validity of an inter vivos trust even though the settlor
reserves a life estate combined with the authority to manage, alter, and
revoke the trust. 22
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-7 (Vernon 1960) (current version at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.004 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
117. 647 S.W.2d at 81 (citing May v. Little, 473 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Purcell v. Snowden, 387 S.W.2d 138, 141-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The Wilkerson court stated: "Inasmuch as a court is per-
mitted to use its equitable powers to impose a trust on a deed based on parol evidence, it
follows a court must be allowed to impose a trust based on more solid evidence such as
written and recorded declaration of trust on a deed." 647 S.W.2d at 8 1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 640 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
121. Id. at 330.
122. Id. at 330 (citing Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 462 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1970, af,'d, 474 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971)).
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Invasion of the Trust Corpus. In Dahl v. Akin ' 23 Lille E. Dahl's will cre-
ated a testamentary trust for the benefit of her husband, George Dahl, and
her daughter, Gloria Akin. The will provided for the distribution of in-
come and corpus to George Dahl in the event his other sources of income
became insufficient to allow him to "maintain . . . the station of life to
which he is accustomed."' 24 Although the will named Dahl as trustee, it
gave Gloria Akin sole discretion in the distribution of trust assets to her
father. The will further provided that the net income remaining after dis-
tributions to Dahl was to be paid to Akin at the discretion of Dahl, as
trustee. Several years after the creation of the trust, Akin made three loans
to Dahl, using income distributed to her under the provisions of the trust.
Thereafter differences arose between Dahl and his daughter. Akin sued
and recovered a judgment against Dahl for the loan amounts due.
On appeal, Dahl argued that because his present income would not en-
able him to both satisfy his indebtedness and maintain his accustomed
lifestyle, the assets of the trust should be used to satisfy the judgment. The
court held that Lille Dahl did not intend that trust assets be used to pay the
indebtedness of George Dahl. 25 The court added, however, that if Dahl's
payment of his obligation to Akin decreased his income below his accus-
tomed standard of living, then Dahl would have recourse to call upon the
trust for distributions of income and/or corpus. 126
Duty of Trustees. In the past, Texas courts have imposed a high standard
of care upon the trustee, who holds a fiduciary position with regard to the
settlor and the beneficiaries.' 27 Accordingly, the courts have required
trustees to make full disclosure to both settlor and beneficiary of all facts
and circumstances within their knowledge relating to the management of
the trust. 28
In Montgomery v. Kennedy 129 the beneficiary of a testamentary trust
claimed that the acting trustee breached his fiduciary duty. Jack Wilker-
son's will created three testamentary trusts, each funded from the residue
of his estate. The will named Wilkerson's wife as the life beneficiary of the
first trust and his two children, Virginia Montgomery and Jack Wilkerson,
as life beneficiaries of the remaining two trusts. The will also provided
that the remainder interest under all three trusts was to pass to Wilkinson's
grandchildren. Wilkerson's wife and son were appointed trustees of the
three trusts. In 1974, prior to the funding of the Wilkerson trust, Virginia
123. 645 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982), affd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 23 (Oct. 8,
1983).
124. Id. at 509.
125. Id. at 524-25.
126. Id.
127. Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 513-14
(1942); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 651 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
128. Johnson v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 152, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1938); Montgomery v.
Kennedy, 651 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ); Kunz v. Huddleston, 546
S.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. 651 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
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Montgomery initiated negotiations with her brother, Jack, to sell her trust
interests and stock ownership in the family-held business to him. All par-
ties to the negotiations were represented by separate counsel. Ultimately
the parties reached a settlement, of which they obtained court approval,
and Virginia Montgomery sold her trust interest. The order approving the
settlement also released the Wilkerson estate from any further claims by
Virginia Montgomery.
Virginia subsequently learned of oil and gas discoveries on the property
that was subject to the agreement, and she filed suit to have the settlement
agreement and release set aside and the testamentary trust reinstated. She
argued that she was entitled to an equitable bill of review on the ground
that her brother Jack, as trustee, fraudulently failed to disclose relevant
information concerning the value of the subject property during the nego-
tiations for the sale of her interest.' 30 In disallowing Montgomery's conten-
tion, the court enumerated the requisite elements of an equitable bill of
review. To be entitled to an equitable bill of review to set aside an earlier
final judgment, a party must allege and prove that he had a meritorious
claim or defense, that he was prevented from making the defense by the
fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party, and that his failure
to make the defense did not result from any fault or negligence of his
own.
13 1
The court found that Jack owed a duty of disclosure to Virginia during
the sale negotiations, and that he had breached this duty by failing to dis-
close all information known to him regarding the value of the mineral
rights in the Wilkerson estate.' 32 The court, however, held that the con-
trolling issue concerned whether Jack's acts constituted extrinsic or intrin-
sic fraud.133 The court explained that extrinsic fraud involves a wrongful
act by a party to a suit that prevents the losing party from knowing his
rights or defenses, thus denying him the opportunity to litigate his case
fully. 134 Only extrinsic fraud entitles a complainant to relief. Intrinsic
fraud, though not a ground for vacating a final judgment in an independ-
ent suit, includes fraudulent matters actually presented to and considered
by the trial court, such as fraudulent instruments or perjured testimony. 35
The court determined that Jack's actions constituted only intrinsic fraud
130. Initially, Montgomery argued that the judgment concerning the previous settlement
was not binding upon the parties, as no controversy was pending at the time of trial. The
court, however, held that TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-24 (Vernon 1960) (current
version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 115.001-.012 (Vernon Pam. 1983)) granted the district
court original jurisdiction to construe the trust instrument and to determine the rights and
liabilities of the trustee. Furthermore, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction
under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965). 651 S.W.2d at
816.
131. Id. at 817 (citing Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Tex. 1979); Petro-
Chemical Transport, Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974)).
132. 651 S.W.2d at 818.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 818 (quoting Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 574, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001
(1950)).
135 651 S.W.2d at 818.
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and therefore it denied Virginia's request for an equitable bill of review. '3 6
The court observed that Mrs. Wilkerson and Jack did nothing to prevent
Virginia from presenting her claim against them. 137 In fact, Virginia con-
sulted a geologist concerning the value of the mineral interests before she
approved the settlement agreement.
In Price v. Johnston 138 Rose Morris's will provided for the creation of
two testamentary trusts. The first trust, referred to as the Price trust,
named the testator's daughter as beneficiary; the second trust, the Johnston
trust, designated the testator's three grandchildren as beneficiaries. Each
trust contained an undivided one-half interest in a particular house and
the property on which the house was situated. The will named Robert M.
Johnston, a beneficiary under the Johnston trust, as trustee for the Price
trust. The Johnston trust was eventually terminated and Harold Johnston,
Robert's brother, became full owner of the one-half interest in the house
and land originally owned by the Johnston trust. Robert Johnston, acting
as trustee over the Price trust, sold to Harold the remaining undivided one-
half interest in the house and property held by the Price trust, thereby
making Harold the owner of the entire fee simple interest in the house and
property.
The testator's daughter, the beneficiary under the Price trust, sought to
have the sale of the Price trust corpus rescinded. She contended that ab-
sent specific provisions in the will, the Texas Trust Act did not allow a
trustee to sell trust assets to a relative.'3 9 Initially, the court noted that the
Morris will did not contain provisions specifically authorizing the trustee
to sell trust property to a relative.' 40 The trustee argued, however, that the
will contained several provisions that granted the trustee broad discretion
in his management duties and that the restrictions of the Texas Trust Act
did not apply.'41 Weighing the broad trustee management powers against
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 638 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
139. The daughter relied on TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-12 (1960) (current
version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.053 (Vernon Pam. 1983)) (trustee buying from or
selling to himself or related parties).
140. 638 S.W.2d at 3.
141. The court stated:
In his brief, defendant points to certain phrases contained in the will (trust)
which he argues gives him the power to sell trust property to a relative. Those
phrases are the one in paragraph III, Sec. 6, which reads: " ... without the
joinder or concurrence of any beneficiary or any other person ."; the one
in paragraph III, Sec. 6(a), which reads, "... on such terms, time and condi-
tion, . . . as the trustee may see fit. ; the one in paragraph Ill, Sec. 6(i),
which reads, "To enter into any agreement deemed advisable by the trustee
. .."; the one in paragraph III, Sec. 6(n), which reads, "... all as the trustee
may deem fit"; the one in paragraph 111, Sec. 7, which reads, "... such indi-
vidual interest of the trustee shall in no way limit the powers herein given and
granted... "; and the one in paragraph III, Sec. 7, which reads, "... but all
acts of the trustee under the terms hereof shall be valid and binding upon the
trust estates and the beneficiaries thereof, whether such acts prove of benefit of
such trust estates or not." Defendant also points to the following sentence
from paragraph IV: "I hereby authorize andempower my Executor to exer-
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the fiduciary standards under the Texas Trust Act, the court found the
trust act controlling. After stating that the statute should be strictly con-
strued in favor of the beneficiaries, the court held that since the will did
not specifically authorize a sale to a relative, the Texas Trust Act must
apply, thus prohibiting the sale of property from the trustee to his
brother. 142
Hostility Not a Groundfor Removal of Trustee. In Dahl v. Akin 143 a dispute
concerning Lille E. Dahl's will ultimately led to a suit between Gloria
Akin, beneficiary and daughter of the deceased, and her father, George
Dahl. Akin unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the court to appoint a
permanent guardian over the personal estate of Dahl, contending that
Dahl had become legally incompetent to attend to his personal and busi-
ness affairs. In response to Akin's guardianship action, Dahl sued Akin for
malicious prosecution and received a favorable monetary judgment for
damages. Akin then brought the present suit seeking to remove Dahl as
trustee. The trial court rendered judgment removing Dahl as trustee, rea-
soning that he had developed such hostility toward Akin that his decisions
as trustee would probably adversely affect Akin's interests. In addition,
the trial court relied on its finding that George Dahl had previously mis-
managed the trust estate.
The Amarillo court of appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled
that the facts presented at trial did not support Dahl's removal as
trustee.144 The court stated that the existence of ill will between a trustee
and a beneficiary does not justify removal of a trustee unless it affects the
trustee's faithful performance of his duties or the special interests of the
beneficiaries.14 5 The court reasoned that the provision of the will exoner-
ating the trustee from any act of misjudgment, together with the absence of
any finding that Dahl's hostility toward the beneficiary had affected his
integrity or discretion, proved sufficient to deny Dahl's removal. 146
Resulting Trusts. A resulting trust can arise in three cases: (1) Upon fail-
ure of a private express trust for want of a beneficiary; (2) When the prop-
erty in a private express trust is excessive for the trust purpose; and
cise and perform all of the powers of sale, leasing and disposition of the
properties of my Estate as I have conferred upon my Trustee in the preceding
Paragraph II of this Will, all free from the control of the Probate Court and
without the joinder or concurrence of any beneficiary, to be exercised by my
Executor in his sole discretion as he may deem fit."
Id.
142. Id. at 4. The court also concluded that it was not necessary to consider the appel-
lant's point of error regarding the inadequacy of consideration since the sale to the brother
could not take place. Id.
143. 645 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982), aft'd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 23 (Oct. 8,
1983); see supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussion of facts).
144. 645 S.W.2d at 533.
145. Id. at 532 (citing White v. White, 15 S.W.2d 1090, 1093 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1929), writ dism'd, 25 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Comm'n App.-1930, holding approved)).
146. 645 S.W.2d at 532.
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(3) When one person provides the purchase money to acquire property
that is conveyed to another person without any indication that the grantee
holds the property as trustee for the person who provided the purchase
money. Two recent Texas cases considered the circumstances under which
a purchase money resulting trust will be recognized.
In Bybee v. Bybee 147 Michael Bybee purchased a one-half interest in
twenty-five acres of land six months prior to his marriage to Rosalie Gil-
bert. Bybee's $2000 down payment consisted of $200 from his future wife,
$1000 from his grandfather, Leon L. Bybee, and his own $800 contribu-
tion. After Bybee and Gilbert were married, payments on the note came
from community property funds. Several years after her marriage to By-
bee, Gilbert sued for divorce and property division. The trial court char-
acterized Bybee and Gilbert as joint purchasers of the one-half interest in
the twenty-five acre tract and divided the property equally between them.
Bybee appealed the equal division ruling.
The appellate court initially characterized the subject property as the
separate property of Bybee. 148 The appellate court then stated that the
only theory that would reconcile the trial court's judgment with its finding
that the property was properly classified as Bybee's separate property was
the theory of a resulting trust in favor of Bybee's wife. 149 Relying on
Wright v. Wright, 150 the court set out the elements of a resulting trust:
It is familiar law that a trust must result, if at all, at the very time a
deed is taken and the legal title vested in the grantee. No oral agree-
ment before or after the deed is taken, and no payments made after
the title is vested, will create a resulting trust, unless the payments are
made in pursuance of an enforceable agreement upon the part of the
beneficiary existing at the time the deed is executed. The trust must
arise out of the transaction itself. 15
The court ultimately held that the facts in the present case were insuffi-
cient to establish a resulting trust, and it remanded the portion of the case
pertaining to the property division to the trial court.' 52 The court also ob-
served that the expenditure of community funds to discharge Bybee's sepa-
rate obligation on the note secured by the property simply created a claim
by the wife for reimbursement of funds used to enhance the value of
Michael Bybee's separate property, less community funds expended to en-
hance the value of her separate property. 153
In 1975 Equitable Trust Company (ETC) obtained a $70,000 judgment
against Jon Roland. In satisfaction of this judgment ETC paid Roland's
receiver $5000 for property owned by Roland, referred to as Henze Farms.
147. 644 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
148. Id. at 219. The court reasoned that since Michael Bybee's name alone appeared on
the promissory note and the deed, the subject property could only be separate property.
149. Id. at 220.
150. 134 Tex. 82, 132 S.W.2d 847 (1939).
151. 644 S.W.2d at 220-21 (quoting Wright, 134 Tex. at 86, 132 S.W.2d at 849).
152. 644 S.W.2d at 222.
153. Id. at 221.
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After Roland had acquired Henze Farms, but before its conveyance to
ETC, Roland had signed an instrument stipulating that he had purchased
Henze Farms as an agent of Miladie Fraser, his mother and true owner of
the property. In Equitable Trust Co. v. Roland 54 ETC sought to establish
clear title to the property by having the transfer from Roland to his mother
set aside. Roland argued that a resulting trust arose when he purchased
Henze Farms and that he served as trustee for the benefit of his mother.
The court held that the instrument produced by Roland was insufficient to
establish a resulting trust in favor of Fraser because the agreement it pur-
ported to show was not entered into contemporaneously with Roland's
purchase of Henze Farms. 55
Constructive Trusts. In the past, Texas courts have used the constructive
trust as an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.156 A construc-
tive trust is distinguishable from a resulting trust in that the law imposes
the trust to prevent the person holding the title to property from profiting
by a wrong. 5 7 Crucial to the existence of a constructive trust is a finding
that the alleged trustee procured the transfer of title to himself either by
fraud, duress, or undue influence or through an abuse of a confidential
relationship between the parties giving rise to a mutual fiduciary duty.15
A purchase money resulting trust, by way of contract, must arise out of an
express agreement entered into contemporaneously with the conveyance to
the alleged trustee. Fraud, duress, undue influence, and confidential rela-
tionships are irrelevant to a finding of a purchase money resulting trust.
In the first case analyzed the court raised a constructive trust, but in the
other three cases, the courts refused to impose a constructive trust, thereby
denying relief to the respective petitioners. In the three cases denying re-
lief, the petitioners had not come into equity with "clean hands,"',5 9 and,
therefore, the court chose to leave the respective petitioners where it had
found them. Finally, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas law in raising a con-
structive trust.
Constructive Trust Raised. In Hudspeth v. Stoker 160 the court imposed a
constructive trust upon proceeds of a life insurance policy for the benefit of
154. 644 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
155. Id. at 51. The court stated:
[Blecause the document offered up by the appellees was executed many years
after the purported trust would have had to have arisen, it cannot be consid-
ered as evidence to establish the existence of such resulting trust. Evidence
contemporaneous with Roland's purchase in 1966 of the interest in the part-
nership, supposedly as his mother's agent, is required to prove such
relationship.
Id.
156. Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367, 373, 341 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1960).
157. Id. at 373, 341 S.W.2d at 405.
158. Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941, 946 (5th Cir. 1983).
159. See id. at 950 n.6.
160. 644 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
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the policyholder's children.' 61 During divorce proceedings between Ed-
ward Hudspeth and his first wife, Christine Stoker, Mr. Hudspeth entered
into a property settlement agreement that designated Stoker, in her capac-
ity as trustee for the benefit of their children, as beneficiary under his
group life insurance policy. Hudspeth agreed to continue making pre-
mium payments on the policy. After the court entered the final divorce
decree, which incorporated the property settlement, Hudspeth's employer
changed insurance carriers and terminated the original life insurance pol-
icy. At the time of Hudspeth's death, his current life insurance policy des-
ignated his second wife as beneficiary. In an interpleader action by the
insurance company, Stoker argued for the imposition of a constructive
trust on the proceeds of the life insurance policy, for the benefit of Hud-
speth's and Stoker's three children.
The court stated that the imposition of a constructive trust required a
showing of either actual or constructive fraud. 162 The law defines actual
fraud as dishonesty of purpose or an intent to deceive, while constructive
fraud entails "a breach of trust or confidential relationship which equity
decrees worthy of protection."' 163 The court, relying on Fitz-Gerald v.
Hull, 164 noted that the acquisition or retention of property through an
abuse of confidence represents unconscionable action and generally justi-
fies declaration and enforcement of a constructive trust. 165 Furthermore,
the court relied on the Florida appellate case of Dixon v. Dixon, 166 which
held under a similar fact situation that the settlement agreement in the
divorce decree essentially surrendered any ownership over the property.
The owner of the policy therefore did not have the authority to change the
beneficiary designation. In addition, the Florida court found no legal sig-
nificance in the change of insurance carriers. 167 Relying on this authority,
the court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust on the life insur-
ance proceeds.'68 The court reasoned that by designating a new benefici-
ary on his group life insurance, Hudspeth contravened the property
settlement agreement incorporated in the divorce decree.'
69
Constructive Trust Denied. Alviso Neely and his wife entered into a con-
tract with Clyde Butler and his wife, wherein the Neelys agreed to make
payments and repairs on the Butler homestead in consideration for the
Butlers' designation of the Neelys as beneficiaries to the Butler homestead
in their wills. The Butlers died without naming the Neelys in their wills,
and the Butlers' executor subsequently deeded the property in controversy
to a third party. The Neelys brought suit against the executor of the Butler
161. Id. at 96.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 150 Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256 (1951).
165. 644 S.W.2d at 94.
166. 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
167. Id. at 481.
168. Hudspeth, 644 S.W.2d at 96.
169. Id.
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estate, without joining the third party, seeking specific enforcement of the
contract between the Butlers and themselves, and requesting that a con-
structive trust be placed upon the Butlers' homestead for the Neelys' bene-
fit. At trial the Neelys produced the contract in question and evidence
showing that the Neelys paid 144 of the 200 payments required under the
contract. The Fort Worth court of appeals held, however, that the Neelys'
failure to comply strictly with the requirements of the contract precluded
them from receiving specific performance of the contract.170 Furthermore,
the court characterized the third party to whom the executor deeded the
property as an indispensable party and held that the Neelys' failure to join
the third-party purchaser prevented the imposition of a constructive trust
on the property. 17 1
In Kennard v McCray 172 Thomas Kennard entered into a licensing con-
tract with a manufacturing company that agreed to market his inventions
and pay him one-half of the royalties. Kennard assigned his right to one-
half of the royalties to his former wife, Lula McCray, in exchange for her
agreement releasing him from his obligation under the divorce decree to
pay child support. Kennard's will named Eula Pope Kennard, his wife at
the time of his death, as independent executrix and sole beneficiary of his
estate. Eula Kennard filed an action against the manufacturing company
claiming it was in breach of its licensing agreement by failing to pay royal-
ties to Kennard's estate from the date of the assignment. 173 Eula Kennard
requested, in the alternative, that the court place a constructive trust for
her benefit on the royalties previously paid to Lula McCray on the ground
that the assignment of the royalty payments from Kennard to Lula Mc-
Cray was void as a matter of law for lack of consideration. Specifically,
Eula Kennard argued that the only consideration for the assignment of
royalties to McCray was an agreement to release Kennard from child sup-
port obligations under the divorce decree and that Texas courts have con-
sistently held that such attempts to modify a decree for child support are
void and unenforceable. The court, however, held that those general prin-
ciples did not apply to this case because such agreements are held void and
unenforceable only in a suit by the wife against the former husband to
compel payment under the terms of the divorce decree. 174 The court dis-
tinguished the current case, noting that here the custodial parent took no
170. Neely v. Schooler, 643 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.). The Neelys sought no other relief but specific performance. Id.
171. Id. Texas law requires that all parties to an action for specific performance who
have an interest in the contract should be stated if known since they are indispensable par-
ties. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 39(c); I R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT
AND COUNTY COURTS § 3.28.4 (F. Elliott rev. ed. 1981)).
172. 648 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
173. In rejecting Eula Kennard's argument against the manufacturing company, the
court stated that lack of consideration is purely a matter between the assignee and the as-
signor. It is immaterial so far as the duty of the manufacturing company is concerned, since
payment to the assignee discharged its obligations under the contract. Id. at 745 (citing St.
Louis Sw. Ry. v. Jenkins, 89 S.W. 1106, 1107 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1905, writ
ref'd)).
174. 648 S.W.2d at 745.
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action to compel the father to make support payments after the execution
of the assignment. 75 McCray made no attempt to enforce the divorce de-
cree. Rather, it was the representative of the noncustodial parent's estate
who sought to set aside the assignment of royalties. The court found suffi-
cient consideration to support the assignment in Lula McCray's forbear-
ance to insist upon payment of the child support arrearages, and the court
therefore denied imposition of a constructive trust.' 76 Finally, the court
concluded that since Kennard had performed an illegal contract the court
would leave the parties where it found them and not use its good offices to
assist one of the parties to that agreement. 177
Constructive Trusts in the Fifth Circuit. Home Engineering, a company
controlled by Alan Whatley, acquired certain real property in 1970 as part
of a scheme with Travis Ward for the ultimate acquisition by Ward of a
490-acre tract in Henderson County. Ward furnished Whatley with $5000
in cash and a $25,000 promissory note to meet the sale price of the subject
property, which was known as the Dyckman property, although various
companies controlled by Whatley actually made the payments on the
promissory note. Thereafter Whatley experienced financial difficulties
causing the foreclosure sale of the Dyckman property to Ward for
$250,000. Ward initiated an interpleader action and asserted a claim to the
proceeds from the foreclosure sale by arguing that Whatley had purchased
the property as his agent, thus entitling him to the net proceeds from the
sale.' 78 A federal district court imposed a constructive trust in favor of
Ward upon the net foreclosure sale proceeds, and Whatley appealed. The
Fifth Circuit noted that Texas law imposes two general prerequisites to the
imposition of a constructive trust: (1) a longstanding fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship between the parties unrelated to the transaction in
question, 179 and (2) a determination that unjust enrichment would result if
the court did not impose the remedy of a constructive trust. 180
Initially, the court addressed the issue of whether a fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship, unrelated to this particular transaction, existed be-
tween Ward and Whatley. In holding that a confidential relationship did
not exist between Ward and Whatley, the court found significant the fact
that their business dealings were not separate and distinct but rather "all
part of a single master plan."'' The court next addressed the issue of
unjust enrichment, noting that while the profit from the Dyckman property
175. Id.
176. Id. at 745-46.
177. Id.
178. Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1983).
179. Id. at 946 (citing Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944-45 (Tex. 1977); Gaines v.
Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 624-25, 358 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (1962)).
180. Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941, 948 (5th Cir. 1983). The court, however,
also stated that since the imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy, there is no
unyielding formula for determining whether a constructive trust exists on each particular set
of facts. Id. at 946.
181. Id. at 948.
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was certainly enrichment, it did not constitute unjust enrichment unless the
profit equitably belonged to another person. 182 Although Ward provided
the down payment for the Dyckman tract, Whatley's companies made the
mortgage payments and managed the property until they were struck by
insolvency. Ward provided the down payment in the hope that it would
aid in the purchase of the 490-acre tract. The court concluded that while
enrichment or profit may have resulted, no unjust enrichment occurred in
this case.183 Thus, with both the fiduciary relationship and unjust enrich-
ment tests unsatisfied, the court reversed the district court's order imposing
a constructive trust on the proceeds from the sale of the Dyckman
property.184
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Probate Court Jurisdiction. In Sobel v. Taylor 185 Dr. Irving Taylor brought
suit in the Harris County district court against his brother, Saul Taylor,
and his sister, Lillian Taylor, individually and in their capacities as co-
trustees and co-executors. The suit alleged that each defendant breached
his or her fiduciary duty in the administration of a trust created by their
mother, Eva Spero, for her own benefit during her lifetime. Dr. Taylor
also alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by Saul and Lillian during the ad-
minstration of their mother's estate.
The district court entered several interlocutory orders regulating the de-
fendants' use of named documents and enjoining defendants from paying
their attorney's fees from the assets of Mrs. Spero's estate until the conclu-
sion of the trial. Saul and Lillian appealed the orders, arguing that under
sections 5(c) and 5(d) of the Probate Code the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the suit and the probate court in which the Taylor will was pro-
bated had jurisdiction. Sections 5(c) and (d) provide in part that all
applications, petitions, and motions regarding probate or estate adminis-
tration must be filed and heard in a statutory probate court, county court,
or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court,
rather than in a district court.' 86 In addition, all courts exercising original
probate jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an
estate. 18 7
182. Id. at 950 (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); 66 AM. JUR. 2d, Resti-
tution and Implied Contracts § 3 (1931)).
183. Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941, 950 (5th Cir. 1983).
184. Id. at 951. In a lengthy dissent Justice Will found the majority opinion inconsistent
with Texas law. Initially, Justice Will stated that Texas case law supports the proposition
that no formula exists with respect to the imposition of a constructive trust and that, there-
fore, the two-prong test proffered by the majority is not to be considered absolute. Rather, a
case-by-case determination is to be made in determining whether a constructive trust is war-
ranted. Id. at 955. Secondly, the dissent agreed with the district court finding that a confi-
dential relationship existed between Ward and Whatley and that Whatley was unjustly
enriched. Id. at 959. Therefore, the dissent argued for upholding the district court judgment
imposing a constructive trust for the benefit of Ward. Id. at 961.
185. 640 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
186. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(c)-(d) (Vernon 1980).
187. Id. § 5(d).
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The court of appeals held that the district court had original jurisdiction
of this case because the action was not primarily a suit concerning or inci-
dent to an estate under section 5 of the Probate Code. I8 8 The court ex-
plained that the allegations chiefly involved acts and misrepresentations
that predated the death of Eva Spero and allegedly occurred while the
appellants were acting as trustees and not as executors for Eva Spero.189
The court in Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank' 90 held that the probate
court had personal jurisdiction to render judgment over the executor of the
Cunningham estate in his individual capacity.' 9 ' In the probate proceed-
ings Maston Cunningham, executor of his mother's estate, filed an applica-
tion to resign as acting executor, stating that he would promptly file a
complete accounting showing the condition of the assets of the Cunning-
ham estate. The probate court granted Maston's motion to resign and or-
dered him to file a complete accounting of his mother's estate. Maston's
"exhibit in final accounting," covering the period in which he administered
the Cunningham estate, stated that the Cunningham estate was insolvent,
but that Maston had advanced to himself and his sister the sum of
$37,607.57. In addition, Maston characterized the advances as claims held
by the estate, enforceable against him and his sister.
The probate court disapproved the exhibit in final account and rendered
judgment in the amount of $37,607.57 against Maston for improper dis-
bursements from the Cunningham estate. In holding that the probate
court had the requisite jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against
Maston, the court of appeals stated that as long as the parties were prop-
erly before the probate court it had jurisdiction to correct any wrongdo-
ing.192 The court relied on Currie v. Drake,193 which upheld a probate
court order requiring the guardian of an estate pending in that court to
restore to the estate money he had improperly diverted from the estate. 194
Venue. In 1981 the county court at law of Fort Bend County appointed
Maria Radford as administratrix of the estate of her deceased sister, Emma
Duren. In 1982, however, Edward Carter filed an application in the Harris
County probate court for the probate of Emma Duren's alleged will. The
Harris County court admitted the will to probate, naming Carter as execu-
tor of the Duren estate, but then transferred the proceedings to the Fort
Bend county court, wherein Carter sought to have Radford's administra-
tion terminated. The Fort Bend county court, however, denied Carter's
request, pending the probate of the Duren will in that court. In response
188. 640 S.W.2d at 707. The court also stated that the main "thrust" of Dr. Taylor's suit
was not of such nature and magnitude as to vest exclusive jurisdiction with the probate
court. Id.
189. Id.
190. 650 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 109
(Dec. 3, 1983).
191. Id. at 485.
192. Id. at 488 (citing Northwest Fuel v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216 (1891)).
193. 550 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. Cunningham, 650 S.W.2d at 488.
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to Carter's appeal of the Fort Bend county court order, Radford filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, arguing that the or-
der did not represent a final appealable order. In Carter v. Radford'9 5 the
court held the Fort Bend county court order to be interlocutory and there-
fore nonappealable. 196 The court stated that section 5(e) of the Texas Pro-
bate Code only allows appeals of final, and not interlocutory, orders from
probate courts.197 Final or appealable orders, as opposed to interlocutory
orders, conclusively dispose of the issues. 198
In applying this definition to the Carter case, the court concluded that
the order denying termination of Radford's administration was interlocu-
tory. 199 The court characterized Carter's effort to act under the proferred
will as premature and instructed Carter to delay his challenge until the
Fort Bend court had probated the will and Carter had been appointed
executor. 200 Furthermore, notwithstanding the court's lack of jurisdiction
in addressing Carter's appeal, the court found that Carter's argument that
section 8(d) of the Texas Probate Code required the Fort Bend court to
recognize and enforce the Harris County district court's decree was unten-
able. The court stated that section 8 only applies when the transferor court
has original jurisdiction over the estate and proper venue. 20'
Standing to Seek Attorney's Fees. The cases continue to reinforce the no-
tion that an attorney hired by a fiduciary is the personal attorney of the
fiduciary. In no sense is the attorney the estate's attorney. Accordingly,
the attorney must look to those who employed him for his compensation.
Whether the fiduciary can then charge his attorney's fees against the prop-
erty included in the estate is a separate question, the resolution of which
depends, in many cases, upon statutory authorization. Usually the stan-
dard applied depends on whether the fees benefited the estate, or whether
the fees incurred resulted from a good faith effort to accomplish probate,
defend a will contest, or resist removal of the fiduciary.
In 1975 Wesley Anderson executed a will that provided for a testamen-
tary trust for the benefit of his two children. Wesley named his brother,
J.C. Anderson, as executor of the estate and as trustee. The trust was to be
funded with the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the testator's life and
the testator's stockholdings at the time of his death. Shortly after the exe-
cution of the will, J.C. Anderson fraudulently procured a change in the
designation of beneficiaries on the testator's life insurance policy and stock
certificates, naming himself as sole beneficiary. The testator, Wesley An-
derson, died in 1976. Shortly thereafter, J.C. Anderson filed an applica-
195. 652 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ).
196. Id. at 471.
197. Id. at 470 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e) (Vernon 1980)).
198. 652 S.W.2d at 471 (citing Cherry v. Reed, 512 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [Ist Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.)).
199. 652 S.W.2d at 469-70.
200. Id. at 471.
201. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 8(d) (Vernon 1980)).
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tion for probate of his brother's will. Wesley's children contested the will
and sought to prevent the appointment of J.C. Anderson as independent
executor. Furthermore, the testator's children obtained a court order re-
quiring Anderson to retain separate counsel for himself, individually and
as independent executor, in defending the will contest suit. Pursuant to
that order, John Miller represented J.C. Anderson in the probate proceed-
ings. At trial the children withdrew their contest to the admission of the
will to probate but proceeded with their suit to prevent J.C. Anderson from
being named independent executor. Upon the withdrawal of the contest
suit, Miller discontinued his representation of Anderson. The court dis-
missed Anderson as executor and named the Corpus Christi National
Bank as the substitute independent executor. Four months after the entry
of the judgment, Corpous Christi National Bank, as trustee, paid Miller his
attorney's fees for the representation of J.C. Anderson with funds from the
Wesley Anderson estate. Wesley Anderson's children argued, however,
that Miller was not entitled to payment from the assets of their father's
estate.
The court of appeals in Anderson v. Anderson202 held that Miller did not
have standing to bring suit for payment of his fees out of the Wesley es-
tate.20 3 The court stated that section 243 of the Texas Probate Code per-
mits the executor, not the executor's attorney, to make a claim against the
estates for attorney's fees incurred in admitting a will to probate.20 4
Notwithstanding Miller's lack of standing, the court added that section 243
requires that the issues of good faith and probable cause in defending the
provisions of a will be raised in the original probate proceeding. The court
concluded, therefore, that section 243 required that the claim be made dur-
ing the original probate proceeding. 205
The Texas Supreme Court, however, in Miller v. Anderson 20 6 reversed
the appellate court decision and held that Miller was entitled to collect the
fee from the testator's estate. 20 7 The court stated that the executor retained
Miller pursuant to the court's order to perform services necessary to pro-
bate the will and that Miller performed those services. 20 8 Miller presented
his claim for these services and received the approval of the Corpus Christi
National Bank. He then filed the claim with the court. In this situation,
Miller's actions were tantamount to presentment of the claim to the court
202. 638 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'dsub nom. Miller v. Anderson, 651
S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1983).
203. 638 S.W.2d at 58.
204. Id. at 58. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (Vernon 1980) provides:
When any person designated as executor in a will or as administrator with
the will annexed, defends it or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, and
with just cause, for the purpose of having the will admitted to probate,
whether successful or not, he shall be allowed out of the estate his necessary
expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, in such
proceedings.
205. 638 S.W.2d at 58.
206. 651 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1983).
207. Id. at 728.
208. Id.
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by the executor, and the court held that Miller had complied with section
243 of the Texas Probate Code.20 9
Furthermore, the supreme court held that Miller did not err in failing to
secure a finding in the trial court on the issues of good faith and probable
cause. 210 In response to cited cases that require a trial court finding on the
issues of good faith and probable cause, the court noted that in both the
cited cases the courts denied probate to the proffered wills, necessitating a
showing of good faith and just cause to demonstrate a compensable benefit
to the estate as required by section 243.211 In this case, however, admitting
the will to probate established a benefit to the estate and made the good
faith and just cause tests inapplicable.212
Premature Claim for Attorney's Fees. In Klein v. Klein2 13 the court denied
an independent executor's request for attorney's fees under section 149C of
the Probate Code, characterizing the request as premature. 21 4 Donald
Klein was the acting independent executor of the estate of Joseph Klein
when Annabelle Klein, beneficiary under Joseph Klein's will, brought suit
to have Donald Klein removed as executor. In her suit Annabelle accused
Donald of misappropriating funds from the estate for his own use and of
gross mismanagement in administering the estate. Donald answered An-
nabelle's petition by filing a general denial and requesting reasonable at-
torney's fees under Probate Code section 149C, which provides that an
independent executor may seek reimbursement for expenses incurred in a
good faith defense against a suit that seeks his removal. 215 Annabelle then
filed her first amended pleading in which she carried forth her prior allega-
tions against Donald and stated additional grounds for his removal. For
reasons unknown to the appellate court the probate court treated the
amended pleading as a separate and distinct proceeding. Furthermore, the
court treated the original petition as still pending and set that cause for
trial. Annabelle's attorneys refused to try the matters in the original peti-
tion without also litigating the additional points raised in Annabelle's
amended pleadings. Her counsel nonsuited the original petition, resulting
in a dismissal without prejudice. The court, however, rendered judgment
in favor of Donald and awarded him reasonable attorney's fees for his
defense in the original proceeding.
On appeal, Annabelle argued that the executor's claim for attorney's
fees was premature as the action to remove the executor was still pending
209. 1d.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Russell v. Moeling, 526 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tex. 1975); Huffv. Huff, 132
Tex. 540, 543-44, 124 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1939)).
212. 651 S.W.2d at 728.
213. 641 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
214. Id. at 389.
215. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(c) (Vernon 1980) provides: "An independent exec-
utor who defends an action for his removal in good faith, whether successful or not, shall be
allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable
attorney's fees, in the removal proceedings."
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in the probate court. Donald argued that denial of his claim for expenses
incurred in defense of the original motion to remove until final disposition
of the parallel proceeding would invite his adversary to file repeated simi-
lar motions, dismissing each in turn. This would defeat or delay his right
to reimbursement for expenses incurred in good faith in defense of an ac-
tion for his removal as allowed by section 149C of the Probate Code. In
response to this argument the court of appeals acknowledged that Don-
ald's contention might have merit if the other pending action involved a
separate parallel proceeding; however, it did not involve such a proceed-
ing. Annabelle's first amended pleading expressly stated that it was an
amendment of the previous motion to remove, as well as of other motions
pending. The amended motion superseded the original motion, leaving
nothing that concerned the removal of Donald pending in the original pro-
bate action that could be construed as a separate proceeding. 216 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs nonsuit could not be considered the termina-
tion of a removal action and that therefore any claim for attorney's fees by
Donald would be premature until final disposition of the suit.2 17
216. 641 S.W.2d at 388.
217. Id. at 388-89.
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